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A NOTE ON THE PROBLEM OF PRISONERS AND HATS
PETR GLIVICKY´
Abstract. We study the famous mathematical puzzle of prisoners and hats. We in-
troduce a framework in which various variants of the problem can be formalized. We
examine three particular versions of the problem (each one in fact a class of problems)
and completely characterize them as to (non)existence of winning strategies.
1. Introduction
Problems that can be collectively denoted as “puzzles of prisoners and hats” have been
studied since 1960’s (see e.g. [Gar61]). The common idea of all such problems can be infor-
mally stated as follows (we give a more precise formulation below): A group of prisoners is
asked to guess colors of hats they are wearing. In general, of course, they are not allowed
to look at their own hats, but may be allowed to see some of the hats that others are
wearing and hear the guesses of some of their colleagues. The goal of the prisoners usually
is to maximize the number of correct guesses. No communication among the prisoners
is allowed since the moment the hats are placed on their heads. However they have an
opportunity to devise a common strategy in advance.
This may seem as just a recreational mathematical puzzle. Nevertheless certain variants
of the problem have been studied and applied in contexts as distinct as coding theory
[Bus12], set theory [GP76] or theory of auctions [AFG+05].
A recent and rather informal introduction to the topic (focused on the infinite case)
is [HT08]. The finite case is studied in more detail in [BHKL08]. An extensive treatise on
the subject is [HT13].
In this paper we describe a framework in which the various versions of the problem of
prisoners and hats can be formalized in a unified way (section 1.2). We use this framework
to classify some of the important cases with regard to existence of a winning strategy for
the prisoners. In particular we will be interested in the “hear nothing, see all” case (section
2.1) and two cases where prisoners can be thought of as standing in a line — the “hear
nothing, see forward” case (section 3.1) and the “hear backward, see forward” case (section
3.2). This, of course, is just the tip of the iceberg. A complete classification of prisoners
and hats problems is an extensive but interesting project and an inspiration for further
research.
This paper was processed with contribution of long term institutional support of research activities
by Faculty of Informatics and Statistics, University of Economics, Prague.
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1.1. Preliminaries and notation.
1.1.1. Basic notation. xy denotes the set {f ; f : x → y} of all functions from x to y. idX
denotes the identity function on X . A natural number n and a function f are understood
in the usual set-theoretical sense, i.e. n = {0, . . . , n− 1} and f = {(x, y); f(x) = y}.
1.1.2. Directed graphs. In a directed graph G = 〈V,E〉 a direction of an edge (v′, v) ∈ E
is understood as from v′ to v. A directed path in G is also called ascending path, while a
descending path in G is a directed path in the graph 〈V,E−1〉.
It is easy to see that if G has no infinite descending paths, then there is a well-ordering
≺⊇ E on V .
1.2. The prisoners and hats problem. The problem we want to investigate is based
on the following story:
1.2.1. A story: Mathematicians and an evil hatter. A nonempty set M of mathematicians
is captured by an evil hatter who announces that the next day they will play a hat guessing
game with their freedom (if they win) or death (if they lose) at stake. The hatter will place
differently colored hats, with colors coming from a nonempty set C, onto mathematicians
heads and the unlucky prisoners will be forced to guess what color they will be wearing.
The malevolent captor reveals some details about the rules in advance:
The game starts with the hatter choosing an assignment a : M → C from certain subset
A ⊆ MC of allowed assignments of hat colors to the mathematicians. He then places
hats accordingly onto mathematicians heads and decides that a mathematician m will be
allowed to see the hat his colleague m′ is wearing if and only if (m′, m) ∈ S for certain
binary relation S ⊆ M2.
The hatter then follows some well-ordering ≺ that extends the canonical partial ordering
of certain directed graph 〈T,H〉 with no infinite descending paths whose vertices are labeled
by mathematicians via some m : T →M (not necessarily one-to-one nor onto) and at time
t ∈ T he asks the mathematician m(t) for her fateful guess (a color from C) which he then
records as g(t). Before m(t) is asked at time t, she will be allowed to hear the record of
all guesses g(t′) such that (t′, t) ∈ H . After her guess, m(t)’s memory is erased so that she
doesn’t remember what she heard nor what her own guess was. (It is easy to see that from
the point of view of the mathematicians, the choice of ≺⊇ H is irrelevant.)
After the whole collection g : T → C of guesses is obtained, the hatter compares it with
the actual assignment a using an evaluation function e : A × TC → 2 and he sets the
mathematicians free if e(a, g) = 1 or executes them if e(a, g) = 0.
The hatter tells the mathematicians what C, A, S, 〈T,H〉, m and e he is going to use
and leaves them for the night. They now have some time to find an optimal strategy that
maximizes their chances of surviving.
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1.2.2. The formalization of the problem. An instance (of the prisoners and hats problem)
is an tuple I = (M,C,A, S, T,H,m, e) where
• M and C are nonempty sets,
• ∅ 6= A ⊆ MC,
• S ⊆M2,
• 〈T,H〉 is a directed graph with no infinite descending paths,
• m : T →M ,
• e : A× TC → 2.
1.2.3. Strategies. There is a game GI of two players (the hatter and the group of mathe-
maticians) with imperfect information that corresponds naturally (according to the story)
to the instance I.
We are not going to define GI here in detail. We just state, in a form of a definition,
what a strategy for mathematicians in this game is:
A strategy (for I) is any function σ : X → C where X is the set of all triples (t, α, γ)
where t ∈ T , α = α′ ↾ S−1[m(t)] for some α′ ∈ A, γ : H−1[t]→ C. Any strategy σ together
with a choice of a ∈ A uniquely determine the course of the game (i.e. the collection of all
guesses g = ga,σ : T → C) and thus the result e(a, g):
Lemma 1. For any strategy σ and a ∈ A there is the unique g = ga,σ : T → C such that
for every t ∈ T
g(t) = σ(t, a ↾ S−1[m(t)], g ↾ H−1[t]).
Proof. As 〈T,H〉 does not contain infinite descending paths, there is a well-ordering ≺⊇ H
on T . Let (tα)α∈δ for some ordinal δ be an enumeration of T such that tα ≺ tβ if and only
if α < β. We construct g : T → C by recursion:
g(tα) = σ(tα, a ↾ S
−1[m(tα)], g ↾ H
−1[tα]),
which is correct since H−1[tα] ⊆≺
−1 [tα] ⊆ {tβ ; β < α}.
The uniqueness of g can be easily proven by induction. 
A strategy σ for I is winning if e(a, ga,σ) = 1 for every a ∈ A.
Strategies for “disjoint” instances can be combined to give a strategy for their “union”:
Let I be a nonempty set and for i ∈ I let σi be a strategy for certain instance Ii =
(Mi, Ci, Ai, Si, Ti, Hi,mi, ei). Assume that the sets Ti, for i ∈ I, are pairwise disjoint and
let
• M =
⋃
i∈I Mi,
• C =
⋃
i∈I Ci,
• A ⊆ {a ∈ MC; (∀i ∈ I)(a ↾Mi ∈ Ai)},
• S ⊇
⋃
i∈I Si,
• T =
⋃
i∈I Ti,
• H ⊇
⋃
i∈I Hi,
• m =
⋃
i∈I mi,
• e : A× TC → 2.
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Then there is a strategy σ for the instance I = (M,C,A, S, T,H,m, e) given by
σ : (t, α, γ) 7→ σi(t, α ↾ S
−1
i [mi(t)], γ ↾ H
−1
i [t])
where i ∈ I is the unique index such that t ∈ Ti. We call such σ the (I-)combination of
strategies σi, i ∈ I, and denote it by
⊔I
i∈I σi or just
⊔
i∈I σi.
2. A set-like case
In this paper, we are going to deal only with cases when every mathematician is asked
for her guess exactly once, i.e. when m : T → M is a bijection. Then we can simplify
our notation by assuming T = M , m = idT and by omitting T and m from the instances,
writing them just as I = (M,C,A, S,H, e). Also we will always have A = MC, which will
allow for another simplification in notation later on.
The following evaluation functions will be used throughout the rest of this paper: For a
cardinal number κ we define evaluation functions e≥κ (at least κ correct guesses) and e
<κ
(less than κ incorrect guesses) by
e≥κ(a, g) = 1⇔ |{m ∈M ; a(m) = g(m)}| ≥ κ,
e<κ(a, g) = 1⇔ |{m ∈M ; a(m) 6= g(m)}| < κ.
The case, we are going to deal with in this section, requires no structure to be defined
on the set M (we call such cases “set-like”). This distinguishes this case from the cases
defined in the following section, where we will be assuming a fixed well-ordering on M
(“well-ordered” cases).
2.1. The “hear nothing, see all” case. Let us denote by hNsA(M,C, e) the instance I =
(M,C,A, S,H, e) with A = MC, S = M2 − idM and H = ∅ (that is every mathematician
sees all hats except her own but hears no previous guesses).
This is a basic case, many subcases of which have been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere.
For the convenience of the reader, we present here a compact selfcontained overview that
gives a complete (at least from our point of view) characterization of existence of winning
strategies.
2.1.1. Case: M finite. If both M and C are finite, then there is a strategy that guarantees
at least ⌊|M |/|C|⌋ correct guesses, but no strategy is able to guarantee more. This was
probably first proven in [Win01] for just two colors and in [Fei04] in full generality (see
also [HT13, Theorem 2.3.1]):
Proposition 2. Let M,C be finite, n ∈ N. Then there is a winning strategy σ for the
instance hNsA(M,C, e≥n) if and only if n ≤ |M |/|C|.
Proof. “⇐”: It is enough to find a winning strategy for hNsA(M ′, C ′, e≥1) where |M
′| = |C ′|.
Indeed, M can be divided into n disjoint sets M0, . . . ,Mn−1 of size |C| and a possible
leftover (as n ≤ |M |/|C|). The combination σ =
⊔
i<n σi of winning strategies σi for
hNsA(Mi, C, e≥1) is then a winning strategy for hNsA(M,C, e≥n). (There is at least one
correct guess on each of n disjoint sets Mi.)
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Let us therefore assume that |M | = |C| and n = 1. Without loss of generality, we can
have M = C ∈ N. Define, for m ∈M and α :M − {m} → C, the value of σ as
σ(m,α, ∅) = m−
∑
m′ 6=m
α(m′),
where the right side is computed modulo M . Then, for a ∈ MC, let ma =
∑
m′∈M a(m
′)
(modulo M). We get
ga,σ(ma) = σ(ma, a ↾ (M − {ma}), ∅) = ma −
∑
m′ 6=ma
a(m′) = a(ma),
thus guaranteeing e(a, g) = 1.
“⇒”: Suppose that there is a winning strategy σ for n > |M |/|C|. Then
|{(a,m); a ∈ A,m ∈M, a(m) = ga,σ(m)}| ≥ n|A| >
|M ||A|
|C|
,
hence for some m ∈ M we get
|{a ∈ A; a(m) = ga,σ(m)}| > |A|/|C|
and consequently
|{a ∈ A; a ⊇ a′, a(m) = ga,σ(m)}| > 1
for some a′ : M − {m} → C. But that means that for some a0 6= a1 from A such that
ai ⊇ a
′ for i < 2 we have a0(m) = ga0,σ(m) = σ(m, a
′, ∅) = ga1,σ(m) = a1(m) and thus
a0 = a1 — a contradiction. 
For infinite C, no strategy can guarantee even one correct guess:
Proposition 3. Let M be finite, C be infinite. Then there is no winning strategy for
hNsA(M,C, e≥1).
Proof. Suppose that a winning strategy σ exists. Let C ′ ⊆ C such that |C ′| = |M | + 1.
Clearly, existence of σ implies existence of a winning strategy for hNsA(M,C ′, e≥1), which
is impossible by the previous proposition. 
2.1.2. Case: M infinite. If |C| = 1, then obviously every strategy guarantees all guesses to
be correct. For infinite M and |C| > 1 there is a strategy that guarantees at most finitely
many incorrect guesses, but no fixed finite number of incorrect guesses can be guaranteed.
The implication “⇐” in the following proposition is known as the Gabay-O’Connor theorem
(see e.g., [HT13, Theorem 3.2.2]):
Proposition 4. Let M be infinite, |C| > 1 and κ a cardinal. There is a winning strategy
for the instance hNsA(M,C, e<κ) if and only if κ ≥ ω.
Proof. “⇐”: Clearly, it is enough to find a winning strategy for hNsA(M,C, e<ω). Denote
∼ the equivalence on A such that a ∼ a′ if and only if a(m) 6= a′(m) for at most finitely
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many m ∈ M . Let s : A/∼ → A be a selector (i.e. s([a]∼) ∼ a for all a ∈ A). Then a
winning strategy can be defined as
σ(m,α, ∅) = s([a]∼)(m),
for m ∈M and α : M−{m} → C, where a ∈ A is arbitrary such that α ⊆ a (the definition
is correct as any a, a′ ⊇ α may have different value only at m and thus a ∼ a′). Indeed, σ
is winning, as for all but finitely many m ∈M we get ga,σ(m) = σ(m, a ↾ (M −{m}), ∅) =
s([a]∼)(m) = a(m).
“⇒”: Suppose that there is a winning strategy σ for hNsA(M,C, e<n) for some n ∈ N.
Choose C ′ = {c0, c1} ⊆ C with c0 6= c1 and M
′ ⊆ M such that |M ′| = 2n. Define
a strategy σ0 for hNsA(M
′, C ′, e<n) by σ0(m,α, ∅) = σ(m,α ∪ ((M −M
′) × {c0}), ∅) for
m ∈ M ′ and α : M ′ − {m} → C ′. Since σ is winning, σ0 is as well. That means that
for each a ∈ M
′
C ′, we have |{m ∈ M ′; a(m) = ga,σ0(m)}| > |M
′| − n = n and thus σ0 is
winning also for hNsA(M ′, C ′, e≥n+1). But by Proposition 2 there is no winning strategy
for hNsA(M ′, C ′, e≥k) with k > |M
′|/|C ′| = n — a contradiction. 
3. Well-ordered cases
We now move to cases where the set M is thought of as well-ordered and S and H are
defined through this ordering.
Let M = 〈M,≺〉 be a nonempty well-ordering. By ≻ we mean ≺−1. We define two
subcases of the problem of prisoners and hats – the “hear nothing, see forward” case and
the “hear backward, see-forward” case:
• hNsF(M, C, e) = (M,C,A, S,H, e) where A = MC, S =≻ and H = ∅,
• hBsF(M, C, e) = (M,C,A, S,H, e) where A = MC, S =≻ and H =≺.
In less formal words, the mathematicians are standing in a (well-ordered) line facing the
(possibly infinite) tail of the line. In hNsF(M, C, e) every mathematician sees all hats in
front of her but hears nothing, while in hBsF(M, C, e) she sees all hats in front of her and
hears all guesses of her colleagues behind her.
Further on we assume (without loss of generality) that M is a nonzero ordinal number
and ≺ is the usual ordering < of ordinals, i.e., M = 〈β,<〉 for an ordinal β > 0.
3.1. The “hear nothing, see forward” case.
3.1.1. Case: M finite. For finite M and |C| > 1 no strategy guarantees even one correct
guess:
Proposition 5. Let |C| > 1 and M = 〈n,<〉 for 0 < n ∈ N. Then there is no winning
strategy for the instance hNsF(M, C, e≥1).
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that σ is a winning strategy for hNsF(M, C, e≥1). We
construct an assignment a ∈ A such that ga,σ(m) 6= a(m) for all m ∈ M . This can
be done easily by reverse induction on n: In the (n − i)th step we set a(i) 6= σ(i, a ↾
{i+ 1, . . . , n− 1}, ∅) = ga,σ(i), which is possible thanks to |C| > 1. 
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3.1.2. Case: M infinite. If M = 〈α,<〉 for α infinite, then the situation is similar to the
“hear nothing, see all” case — at most finitely many incorrect guesses can be guaranteed,
but there is no finite upper bound on their number. The idea of the proof of the implication
“⇐” in the following proposition comes from [HT13, Theorem 4.2.1], however our setting
is different:
Proposition 6. Let |C| > 1, M = 〈β,<〉 for an ordinal β ≥ ω, and κ be a cardinal.
There is a winning strategy for the instance hNsF(M, C, e<κ) if and only if κ ≥ ω.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.
“⇐”: Clearly, it is enough to find a winning strategy σ for hNsF(M, C, e<ω): Form ∈M
we define the equivalence ∼m on A =
MC by a ∼m a
′ if and only if a(m′) = a′(m′) for all
m′ > m (that is for all m′ that m can see). We denote by s the selector on P(A)−{∅} that
for ∅ 6= X ⊆ A selects s(X) as the <A-least element of X , where <A is a fixed well-ordering
of A. The strategy σ can then be defined as
σ(m,α, ∅) = s([a]∼m)(m),
for m ∈ M and α : {m′ ∈ M ;m < m′} → C, where a ∈ A is arbitrary such that α ⊆ a
(this is correct as any two such a’s are ∼m-equivalent).
We prove that σ is winning for hNsF(M, C, e<ω): For contradiction, let there be a ∈ A
and M ′ ⊆ M infinite such that for all m ∈M ′
a(m) 6= ga,σ(m) = σ(m, a ↾ {m
′ ∈M ;m < m′}, ∅) = s([a]∼m)(m). (1)
Let us choose an increasing sequence m0 < m1 < · · · of length ω in M
′. We show
that then s([a]∼m0 ) >
A s([a]∼m1 ) >
A · · · is a strictly <A-decreasing sequence in A, which
is in contradiction with <A being a well-ordering: From mi < mi+1 it follows (∀a
′ ∈
A)(a ∼mi a
′ → a ∼mi+1 a
′), i.e., [a]∼mi ⊆ [a]∼mi+1 and thus s([a]∼mi ) ≥
A s([a]∼mi+1 ) by
the definition of s. But the equality is not possible since that would mean ga,σ(mi+1) =
s([a]∼mi+1 )(mi+1) = s([a]∼mi )(mi+1) = a(mi+1), contradicting (1).
“⇒”: Assume for contradiction that there is a winning strategy σ for hNsF(M, C, e<n)
for some 0 < n ∈ N. Then we can take M′ = 〈n,<〉 ⊆ M and define a strategy σ0
for hNsF(M′, C, e<n) by σ0(m,α, ∅) = σ(m,α ∪ ((M −M
′) × {c0}), ∅) for m ∈ M
′ and
α : {m′ ∈ M ′;m < m′} → C, where c0 ∈ C is fixed. From our assumption on σ it
follows that σ0 is winning for hNsF(M
′, C, e<n), and thus (because |M ′| = n) also for
hNsF(M′, C, e≥1). This contradicts Proposition 5. 
3.2. The “hear backward, see forward” case. The approach we are going to present
is an algebraic one. All the theorems that we use and that go beyond an elementary
course of algebra can be found in [Zie84]. The author owes the credit for the idea to Jan
Sˇaroch [Sˇ10].
Before stating the crucial Lemma 7, let us recall some notions concerning Abelian groups.
For an (additively written) Abelian group G and an ordinal δ, we denote by Gδ the product
of δ copies of G, that is the group whose underlying set is δG = {f ; f : δ → G} and
the group operation is defined pointwise. By G(δ) we denote the direct sum of δ copies
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of G, that is the subgroup of Gδ whose underlying set is {f ; f : δ → G and f(α) =
0 for all but finitely many α ∈ δ}. There is the natural sum homomorphism Σ : G(δ) → G
defined by Σ(f) = f(α0)+ · · ·+ f(αn−1) where α0, . . . , αn−1 is an enumeration of all α ∈ δ
for which f(α) 6= 0 and the sum is computed in G.
Lemma 7. For any ordinal δ > 0 and cardinal µ > 0 there is an Abelian group G of size
µ such that the sum homomorphism Σ : G(δ) → G can be extended to a homomorphism
Σ′ : Gδ → G.
Proof. For µ ≥ ω, let G be a divisible Abelian group of size µ, e.g. G = Q(µ). Then G
is injective in the category of Abelian groups and thus Σ factors through the inclusion
idG(δ) : G
(δ) → Gδ, yielding the required Σ′.
For 1 < µ < ω, we take G = Z/µZ (the additive group of integers modulo µ). Then
G is purely injective (because finite). The inclusion idG(δ) : G
(δ) → Gδ is pure (even an
elementary embedding, see [Zie84, Corollary 1.8]) and so Σ factors through it, yielding Σ′
as before. 
Now we are ready to show that for the “hear backward, see forward” case there is always
a strategy that guarantees at most one incorrect guess:
Proposition 8. Let |C| > 1, M = 〈M,≺〉 be arbitrary, and κ be a cardinal. There is a
winning strategy for hBsF(M, C, e<κ) if and only if κ ≥ 2.
Proof. “⇒”: Suppose for contradiction that there is a winning strategy σ for the instance
hBsF(M, C, e<1), that is that σ guarantees all guesses correct. Then for the ≺-least element
m ∈M we get a(m) = ga,σ(m) = σ(m,α, ∅) = ga′,σ(m) = a
′(m) for any α :M −{m} → C
and α ⊆ a, a′ : M → C. This is of course a contradiction as we may take a, a′ such that
a(m) 6= a′(m).
“⇐”: It is enough to find a winning strategy for hBsF(M, C, e<2). The case |M | = 1
is trivial. Further on we assume |M | > 1. Without loss of generality suppose that M =
δ ∪ {−1}, for an ordinal δ > 0, ≺ is the usual ordering of δ ∪ {−1} and C = µ > 0
a cardinal. By Lemma 7 there are an Abelian group G of size µ and a homomorphism
Σ′ : Gδ → G extending the sum homomorphism Σ : G(δ) → G. Again, without loss of
generality, we may assume that the underlying set of G is µ = C.
We define σ as follows:
σ(−1, α, ∅) = Σ′(α) for α ∈ Gδ = MC, and σ(β, α, γ) = γ(−1)− Σ′(α ∪ {(β, 0)} ∪ γ ↾ β),
for β ∈ δ, α : {β ′; β < β ′ ∈ δ} → C, and γ : β ∪ {−1} → C, where the subtraction is
computed in G.
We prove that
ga,σ(β) = a(β) (2)
for all β ∈ δ and a ∈ A by induction on β: First, ga,σ(−1) = σ(−1, a ↾ δ, ∅) = Σ
′(a ↾ δ)
(which may differ from a(−1)). For the inductive step, let us assume (2) for all β ′ < β.
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Then
ga,σ(β) = σ(β, a ↾ {β
′; β < β ′ ∈ δ}, ga,σ ↾ (β ∪ {−1})) =
= ga,σ(−1)− Σ
′(aβ) =
= Σ′(a ↾ δ)− Σ′(aβ) =
= Σ′(a ↾ δ − aβ) =
= Σ(a ↾ δ − aβ) =
= a(β),
where aβ = a ↾ (δ − {β}) ∪ {(β, 0)}, the first equality is just definition of ga,σ, the second
one holds due to the inductive assumption, the third one holds by the “−1st step”, and
the last three follow from the properties of Σ and Σ′ and the definition of aβ. 
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